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Abstract. Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Mul-
tiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game
theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-
Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic [43], however, its behavior in
higher dimensions is not well understood. We provide a complete char-
acterization of its behavior in zero-sum evolutionary games. We prove
that, if and only if, the system has an interior Nash equilibrium, the dy-
namics exhibit Poincare´ recurrence, i.e., almost all orbits come arbitrary
close to their initial conditions infinitely often. If no interior equilibria
exist, then all interior initial conditions converge to the boundary. Specif-
ically, the strategies that are not in the support of any equilibrium vanish
in the limit of all orbits. All recurrence results furthermore extend to a
class of games that generalize both graphical polymatrix games as well
as evolutionary games, establishing a unifying link between evolutionary
and algorithmic game theory. We show that two degrees of freedom, as
in Rock-Paper-Scissors, is sufficient to prove periodicity.
Fig. 1: One agent Rock-Paper-Scissor, see 3.4. Animation here
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1 Introduction
Replicator dynamics is a basic model of evolution that is amongst the most well
studied game theoretical models of adaptive behavior [1,2]. It is the standard
dynamic in evolutionary game theory [17,42] and enjoys formal connections to
other classic evolutionary models such as the Price equation, the Lotka-Volterra
equation of ecology and the quasispecies equation of molecular evolution [31,11].
Replicator also has strong, inherent connections to computer science and op-
timization theory. It is the continuous time-analogue of Multiplicative Weights
Update [23], arguably the most widely studied online learning and optimization
algorithm and a meta-algorithmic technique in itself with numerous applica-
tions [5]. Furthermore, it has diverse microcanonical foundations [39], i.e., it can
emerge from numerous, simple (memoryless, best-response like) population dy-
namics, which enhance its plausibility as a model of emergent behavior. Finally,
it has an interpretation as an inference dynamic [16,21]. Specifically, for systems
governed by the replicator equations the maximum entropy principle (MaxEnt)
can be derived rather than postulated as, e.g., in thermodynamics or statistical
mechanics [20]. Given this impressive web of connections, it would not be un-
reasonable to think of replicator as a near-universal model of adaptive behavior,
a proto-intelligence mechanism, emerging from simple physical processes and
giving rise to self-organizing, ever-more complex and efficient systems. As such
understanding its behavior in different contexts can simultaneously shed light to
many of its related adaptive processes.
Evolution as it turns out is a very efficient force of systemic optimization.
Replicator dynamics is a regret minimizing dynamic in arbitrary games. Its re-
gret converges to zero at a rate of O(1/T ) [26,24]. Specifically, its total regret
remains bounded for all time. In cases of games where agents’ interests are
strongly aligned, such as potential, i.e., congestion games, replicator dynamics is
known to perform admirably well. Not only does it converge to Nash equilibria
[40] but typically to pure Nash [23]. Furthermore, it has been shown that pure
Nash equilibria of higher social welfare have larger regions of attraction and
hence an average case analysis of replicator dynamics where the initial condition
is drawn uniformly at random can lead to an expected social welfare that can
be much higher than those predicted by Price of Anarchy analysis [32]. Finally,
even in games where the dynamics are non-equilibrating replicator dynamics
may converge to limit cycles with optimal social welfare that dominate the per-
formance of even the best Nash equilibrium by an arbitrary amount [22,15]. That
is, replicator dynamic can significantly outperform even Price of Stability type
of guarantees.
When we move to zero-sum games (and variants thereof) Price of Anarchy
and more generally social welfare optimization type of results are no longer appli-
cable. One would hope that in such games the Nash equilibria would be accurate
predictors of the system behavior. If so equilibration would have not only a strong
economic and algorithmic justification due to the celebrated maxmin theorem
by von Neumann [28] and its connection to linear programming but also an evo-
lutionary one. Unfortunately, this is not the case. [41] established experimentally
that even small zero-sum games may have complex, non-equilibrating, chaotic
type of behavior. More recently, [37] established that despite their chaotic behav-
ior, these dynamics have also exploitable structure. Specifically, replicator dy-
namics in two-player zero-sum games with interior Nash equilibria are Poincare´
recurrent. This means that almost all initial conditions return infinitely often
arbitrarily close to their initial conditions. This result holds even for networks of
zero-sum games, however, this class of games fails to capture the standard class of
evolutionary zero-sum games. The immediate distinction between evolutionary
games and standard multi-agent games is that evolutionary games only admit a
single distribution over a simplex of strategies. These are games where a large
population of animals compete against each other and where the frequencies
of the different genotypes/strategies evolve according to the replicator dynam-
ics. From the perspective of standard two-agent zero-sum games, the question
reduces to analyzing antisymmetric zero-sum games (i.e. Rock-Paper-Scissors)
under symmetric initial conditions. Due to the (anti)-symmetric nature of the
game, the symmetry of initial condition is preserved by the dynamic. Thus, the
dynamic evolves on a lower-dimensional manifold, which is a zero-measure set,
hence the Poincare´ recurrence result of [37] does not suffice to understand the
behavior for such non-generic initial conditions. Our goal here is to completely
understand the behavior of replicator dynamics in such settings and furthermore
develop an expansive unifying framework for understanding dynamics both in
evolutionary games as well as two-agent and multi-agent settings as well.
Our results. We provide a complete characterization of the behavior of
replicator dynamic in zero-sum evolutionary games. We prove that if and only
if, the system has an interior Nash equilibrium, the dynamics exhibit Poincare´
recurrence. If no interior equilibria exist, then all interior initial conditions con-
verge to the boundary (Theorem 6). Specifically, the strategies that are not in the
support of any equilibrium vanish in the limit of all orbits. All recurrence results
furthermore extend to a class of games that generalize both graphical polyma-
trix games as well as evolutionary games (Theorem 5). Specifically, we allow for
polymatrix edges with self-edges, where all polymatrix games are constant-sum,
and all self-edges are antisymmetric games. To prove these results, we provide
the most general to date set of game theoretic conditions under which replica-
tor dynamics can be shown to be volume preserving (under a diffeomorphism,
i.e. a differentiable transformation with invertible inverse) (Theorem 4). The
other stepping stone in the direction of proving recurrence/convergence to the
boundary is showing that the KL-divergence between the Nash equilibrium and
the state of the system is invariant/strictly decreasing if the zero-sum games
has/(does not have) an interior Nash. This argument mirrors arguments for the
case of multiple agent replicator dynamics [37,26] Finally, we show that in this
class of games, two degrees of freedom, as in Rock-Paper-Scissors, is sufficient
to prove periodicity (Theorem 9). Furthermore, as we argue this does not follow
from an immediate combination of Poincare´ recurrence and Poincare´-Bendixson
theorems but requires more specialized arguments. The full version of this paper
can be found online [12].
2 Related work
Non-equilibration, recurrence and volume preservation. In evolutionary
game theory, numerous non-convergence results are known but they are usually
restricted to small games [39]. [3] was the first paper to study both discrete
and continuous-time evolutionary dynamics in zero-sum games and establish
invariant for the dynamics, however, no formal recurrence or periodicity was
shown. Constants of the motion exist for different classes of games (e.g. coor-
dination/partnership games, null stable games) and dynamics [19,39,32] even
for games with convergent dynamics. An orthogonal property of game dynam-
ics is the preservation of volume of initial conditions (up to state space/speed
transformation, see [19,39,26]). [37] and [35] showed that replicator dynamics in
(network) zero-sum games (and affine variants thereof) exhibit a specific type
of repetitive behavior, known as Poincare´ recurrence by combining these two
type of arguments. Recently, [26] proved that Poincare´ recurrence also shows
up in a more general class of continuous-time dynamics known as Follow-the-
Regularized-Leader (FTRL). [25] established that the recurrence results for repli-
cator dynamics extend to some biologically-inspired dynamically evolving zero-
sum games. Perfectly periodic (i.e., cyclic) behavior for replicator may arise in
team competition [36] as well as in network competition [27]. Our techniques
build and extend upon these results by producing necessary, as well as sufficient
conditions, for volume preservation, recurrence as well as periodicity.
Game dynamics as physics. Recently, [9] established a connection be-
tween game theory, online optimization in continuous-time (FTRL dynamics)
and a ubiquitous class of systems in physics known as Hamiltonian dynam-
ics, which exhibit conservation laws (“conservation of energy”). In the case of
discrete-time dynamics such as MWU or gradient descent the system trajec-
tories are first order approximations of the continuous-time dynamics. Energy
conservation and recurrence no longer hold. Instead energy increases and the
dynamics divergence to the boundary [7]. The dynamics exhibit volume expan-
sion and Lyapunov chaos [13]. Despite this divergent, chaotic behavior, gradient
descent with fixed step size, has vanishing regret in small zero-sum games [8].
More elaborate discretization techniques, based on leap-frogging (Verlet) sym-
plectic integration technique for Hamiltonian dynamics, result in discrete-time
algorithms of bounded regret in general games and Poincare´ recurrence in zero-
sum games respectively [6]. So far, it is not clear to what extent the connections
with Hamiltonian dynamics can be generalized; however, [30] have considered
a class of piecewise affine Hamiltonian vector fields whose orbits are piecewise
straight lines and developed the connections with best-reply dynamics.
Game dynamics as dynamical systems. Finally, [33,34] initiated a pro-
gram for linking game theory to topology, specifically to Conley’s fundamental
theorem of dynamical systems [14]. This approach shifts attention from Nash
equilibria to a more general notion of recurrence, called chain recurrence, that
generalizes both periodicity and Poincare´ recurrence. [29] embeds this approach
within an algorithmically tractable framework and uses it to develop new train-
ing algorithms for multi-agent AI settings.
3 Preliminaries and definitions
3.1 Zero-sum games and Zero-sum polymatrix games
A graphical polymatrix game is defined using a directed graph G = (V,E) where
V corresponds to the set of agents (or players) and where every edge corresponds
to a bimatrix game between its two endpoints/agents. Each agent i ∈ V has a
set of actions Ai = {1 . . . ni} that he is allowed to select randomly under a
distribution xi called a mixed stragegy. The set of mixed strategies of player i is
written Xi = ∆IRni = {xα ∈ IRni≥0 :
∑
α xα = 1}; the state of the game is then
defined by the concatenation of strategies of all players. We call strategy space
the set of all possible strategies profiles, and write it X ≡∏i∈V Xi.
The bimatrix game on edge (i, j) is described using a pair of matrices Ai,j ∈
IR|Ai|×|Aj | and Aj,i ∈ IR|Aj |×|Ai|. The coefficient (α, β) ∈ Ai ×Aj of the matrix
Ai,j represents the reward player i gets when he plays α against player j playing
β. As players can choose mixed strategies, their payoffs are random variables,
yet we call payoffs again their expected payoffs. For instance, the payoff of player
i against player j is xi · Ai,jxj . We call payoff of agent i ∈ V under strategy
profile x the sum of the payoffs agent i receives from every bimatrix game he
participates in, and write it ui(x) or ui(xi;x−i). More precisely,
ui(x) =
∑
j : (i,j)∈E
xi ·Ai,jxj (1)
Sometimes, one can be interested in the payoff of agent i when deviating to
action α ∈ Ai under profile x. This quantity is usually denoted ui,α(x) and
corresponds to
∑N
j=1(A
i,jxj)α. Finally, we will compactify the definition of a N -
player graphical polymatrix game by a tuple Γ = (G,A) with G the underlying
graph and A the block matrix built from Ai,j ’s.
We say that a N -player graphical polymatrix game is zero-sum if the matrix
A is antisymmetric. In the case N = 2 players i, j = 1, 2, it specifically means
that A1,2 = −(A2,1)T ; in the case N = 1 player, that A1,1 = A is antisymmetric.
In our case, we allow the graphG to contain self-loops, and we call diagonal games
the subgames induced by self-loops. Self-loop (1-agent) games make sense both in
the content of evolutionary game theory as well as in classic (multi-agent) game
theory. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, 1-agent games are the
norm where we study the frequencies of different competing genotypes within
a single population. For example, Rock-Paper-Scissors could be different traits
that exhibit a cyclic pattern of dominance. In the context of classic game theory
a single agent self-loop added e.g. on top of a standard normal form game can
capture effects like friction in dynamics, e.g. the matrix with zero diagonal and
-1 in all other entries captures the effects of having cost for changing strategy.
Specifically, if an agent changes her strategy from yesterday, then in the self-
loop game, she experiences an additional cost of 1. More generally, it allows to
differentiate the performance of a strategy for an agent depending on his strategy
in the previous time period in game dynamics such as replicator dynamics.
P0
P1
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Fig. 2: From left to right, graphical representations of the evolutionary game
setting, algorithmic game theory, and the merger of the two.
A very common notion in game theory is the one of Nash equilibrium (NE),
defined in our case as a mixed strategy profile x∗ ∈ X such that
ui(x
∗) ≥ ui,αi(x∗) (2)
for every strategy αi ∈ Ai of any player i ∈ N . We write supp(x∗i ) ≡ {αi ∈
Ai : xi,αi > 0} the support of x∗i ∈ Xi. A Nash equilibrium is said interior or
fully mixed if supp(x∗i ) for each agent i is Ai.
3.2 Replicator dynamics
The replicator equation is one of the most well studied evolutionary processes.
Its most usual formulation is:
x˙i,α =
dxi,α
dt
= xi,α (ui,α(x)− ui(x)) (3)
for every player i and action α ∈ Ai. We will often translate (3) into cumulative
costs space via the diffeomorphism from the interior of X to C ≡∏ IRni−1, used
also in [37], that, for each player i, maps xi = (xi,1 . . . xi,ni) to (ln
xi,2
xi,1
. . . ln
xi,ni
xi,1
).
We will write this diffeomorphism f and its inverse f−1. C is called this way
since one can show that it corresponds to the space of coordinates
∫ t
0
ui,α(x(τ))dτ
up to a re-centralization term (specifically,
∫ t
0
ui,α(x(τ))dτ −
∫ t
0
ui,1(x(τ))dτ for
α > 1).
3.3 Topology of dynamical systems
Flows. Since the strategy space is compact and the replicator dynamics Lipschitz-
continuous, there exists a continuous function φ : X × IR → X called flow of
replicator dynamics (3) such that for any point x ∈ X , φ(x,−) defines a function
of time corresponding to the trajectory of x. Conversely, fixing a time t provides
a map φt ≡ φ(−, t) : X → X , and the family {φt : t ∈ IR} is interestingly a
subgroup of (C(X ,X ), ◦). Moreover, if φt : A → A and ψt : B → B are flows
such that there exists a diffeomorphism g satisfying g(φt(x)) = ψt(g(x)) for all
x ∈ A, then φt and ψt are said to be diffeomorphic to each other.
Limit sets. When x ∈ X is not a rest point of (3), we wish to grasp how
the orbit of x will asymptotically behave. In general, its trajectory will not
converge to a single point, but to a closed set called the ω-limit (set) of x, written
ω(x). This set is formally defined as the set of points y ∈ X such that there
exists a sequence (tn) diverging to +∞ such that φ(x, tn)→ y. One alternative
definition is ω(x) =
⋂
t≥0
⋃
τ≥t φ(x, τ). The compactness of ω(x) is an immediate
consequence of the compactness of X , and limt→+∞ dist(φ(x, t), ω(x)) = 0.
Liouville’s formula. Liouville’s formula can be applied to any system of ordinary
differential equations with a continuously differentiable vector field ξ on an open
domain X ⊆ IRd. The divergence of ξ at x ∈ X is the trace of the Jacobian at
x, that is, div ξ(x) =
∑d
i=1
∂ξi
∂xi
(x). Because the divergence is continuous, it is
integrable on measurable subsets of X . Given any such set A, define the image of
A under the flow φ at time t as A(t) = {φ(a, t) : a ∈ A}. A(t) is measurable and
of volume vol[A(t)] =
∫
A(t)
dµ. Liouville’s formula states that the time derivative
of the volume vol[A(t)] exists and links it to the divergence of ξ,
d
dt
[
vol A(t)
]
=
∫
A(t)
div(ξ) dµ (4)
One immediate consequence is that if div ξ(x) is null at any x ∈ X , then the
volume is conserved. As div ξ is clearly a continuous function, the reverse state-
ment is also true. If the volume is preserved on any open set, div ξ(x) has to be
null at any point x ∈ X .
Poincare´ recurrence. This paper is focused on a recurrence behavior introduced
by Poincare´ and more precisely by his studies on the three body problem. He
proved [38] that as soon as a dynamical system preserves volume and that every
orbit remains bounded, almost all trajectories return arbitrarily close to their
initial position, and do so infinitely often.
Theorem 1 (Poincare´ recurrence). [10] If a flow preserves volume and has
only bounded orbits then for each open set, almost all orbits intersecting the set
intersect it infinitely often.
3.4 Volume conservation and periodicity in Rock-Paper-Scissors
The front page figure shows the evolution of a set of initial conditions (black
square) under replicator dynamics (3) in the (projected) cumulative payoff space;
the game is the classic one agent Rock-Paper-Scissors with payoff matrix 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0

In the first row of the figure from left to right, we plot the evolution of a set
at times t = 0, t = 112 and t = 225. The colormap represents the Kullback-
Leibler divergence to the unique Nash equilibrium x = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) (null vector in
cumulative payoffs space). Observe that any point stays at the same color at
which it started, i.e., its Kullback-Leibler divergence from the Nash equilibrium
does not change. On the second row are the corresponding plots of the Kullback-
Leibler divergence of points (y-axis) according to their first coordinate (y1 in C).
The red curve is the minimum possible value for each y1 values, that is, an
analogue of potential energy. Intuitively, any initial condition will slide along an
horizontal level set (of constant KL-divergence) and cannot escape outside the
red curve. The third row shows an estimation of the volume of the cloud of points
over time. This volume is estimated using a pruned Delaunay triangulation, more
precisely, triangles with a diameter larger than some threshold value are deleted,
and the volume is computed as the sum of the volume of each remaining triangle.
Even though the shape of the initial condition is not preserved, the overall
volume is constant over time. This spiralling snake shape results from periodic
orbits of different periods.
4 Volume conservation: Necessary and sufficient
conditions
4.1 Zero-sum games are volume conservative
Replicator dynamics in multi-games (with no loops) are volume conservative
(even beyond replicator dynamics [26]). The reason becomes clear when we ex-
amine the differential equation satisfied by cumulative payoffs yi,α’s.
dyi,α
dt
(t) = ui,α+1
(
f−1(y)
)− ui,1 (f−1(y)) (5)
Recall that f−1 acts like a set-wise product function, working locally at each
player. Hence, as long as ui,β does not depend on xi, ui,β is independent of
yi,α for any pair of actions α, β. The partial derivative
∂y˙i,α
∂yi,α
(y) is null. One
can understand this as follows: if the performance of an action only depends
on the behavior of the rest of the agents, then the volume is preserved. In single
agent games, antisymmetry implies volume preservation [39]. We show that these
results can be combined and that there is no need to have null diagonal games to
get volume preservation in multi-agent games. The zero-sum property is enough
to guarantee it.
Theorem 2. Let φ be the flow of replicator dynamics (3) with N agents. Let
ψ(y,−) = f(φ(f−1(y),−)) be the diffeomorphic flow onto cumulative payoffs
space. If all diagonal games are zero-sum, then ψ is volume conservative.
We know that if there are no games on the diagonal, the volume is preserved.
The intuition is that if each diagonal game preserves volume individually, there
will be volume preservation; this is the main point. We rely on Liouville’s formula
(4) by computing the divergence in the general case, and check that it is null if
all diagonal games are zero-sum. This proves that in N -player polymatrix games
with loops, as long as loops are antisymmetric games, the quantity of information
is preserved in cumulative payoffs space. It also means that it will be hard to
converge; for instance, no interior rest point cannot be locally attractive. Indeed,
if that was the case, it would mean that locally, the volume would shrink around
the rest point.
4.2 Volume conservative games are zero-sum
What is even more interesting is that the inverse statement is also true. The
preservation of information in cumulative payoff space is specific to zero-sum
diagonal games. We do not mean that a non-zero-sum game cannot preserve
volume at some points, but rather that preserving volume at many points im-
plies the zero-sum property. The precise number of points can be controlled by
combinatorial Nullstellensatz arguments, and more precisely, the relation be-
tween a multivariate polynomial and the geometry of its vanishing set.
The argument is that the divergence of the vector field (in cumulative space)
is a multivariate polynomial, and in particular, this polynomial vanishes exactly
at points were the volume is preserved.
We give a proof for the evolutionary game theory settings, but it can be eas-
ily transported to N -player polymatrix games, notations would merely become
heavier.
Theorem 3. Consider a 1-player game Γ . Let φ be the flow of replicator dy-
namics and ψ its diffeomorphic conjugate onto the cumulative payoffs space. If
there exists an open set U of IR|A|−1 such that ψ is volume conservative at any
point of U , then Γ is equivalent to a 1-player zero-sum game (summation of an
antisymmetric matrix and a matrix of the form
(
1 · · · 1)T (c1 · · · cn)).
Proof. Let us rewrite A = {1 . . . n}, and A = (Aα,β) the matrix corresponding
to Γ . The existence of such an open set U induces another interior open set V
of X such that for any point x of V , the divergence of ∂ψ∂t at y = f(x) is null.
A general formula for this divergence is given in the appendix (see Lemma 7).
Using it, we get
div
∂ψ
∂t
(y) =
n∑
α=1
xαAα,α −
n∑
α=1
n∑
β=1
xαxβAα,β (6)
The above equality means that for any x of V ,
∑
α xαAα,α =
∑
α,β xαxβAα,β .
Take any action γ ∈ {1 . . . n}, without loss of generality action γ = n. We have
xn = 1−x1−. . .−xn−1. Saying that the divergence of ∂ψ∂t is null on V means that
the multivariate polynomial (6) of [x1 . . . xn−1] vanishes on the open set V . Since
V is interior and open, the latest polynomial have to be null [4]. Accordingly, all
the coefficients of (6) are zero’s.
In particular, the coefficient of x2α is null; but developing (6), this coefficient
is precisely Aα,α + An,n − Aα,n − An,α. As we took γ = n wlog, we just proved
that Aα,α +Aβ,β −Aα,β −Aβ,α = 0, that is
Aα,α −Aα,β = −(Aβ,β −Aβ,α) (7)
for any actions α and β. This means that A can be rewritten as the sum of an
antisymmetric matrix B and a column-constant matrix. Specifically,
A = B +
(
1 · · · 1)T (A1,1 · · · An,n) (8)
with B antisymmetric. It is easy to see [18] that the flow of replicator dynamics
with matrix B is the same as the one with matrix A, hence (from the perspective
of replicator dynamics) Γ is equivalent to a zero-sum game. uunionsq
One is easily convinced that this is generalizable to much more general games,
for e.g. polymatrix games, by adapting the proof the following way: the multi-
variate polynomial’s variables are strategies xi,α, and since the divergence of the
vector field is separable on each players, we get the exact same condition for
each diagonal game. Therefore, we have the more stronger result.
Theorem 4. A N -player (polymatrix)1 game is volume conservative in cumu-
lative payoffs space if, and only if its diagonal games are equivalent to zero-
sum games (summation of an antisymmetric matrix and a matrix of the form(
1 · · · 1)T (c1 · · · cn)).
This formaly shows that volume preservation strongly correlates with zero-
sum games. Furthermore, a polymatrix game that conserves volume on an open
set has to conserve volume everywhere. Observe that we could have been less
restrictive on the assumption relating the geometry of the vanishing set, so there
is room to improve this result. The take home idea may be if diagonal games
are not zero-sum, the volume cannot be preserved at too many points.
5 Limit behavior: Poincare´ recurrence, cycles and
convergence to boundary
5.1 Zero-sum games with interior Nash are Poincare´ recurrent
We generalize previous result from [37]. It is already known that zero-sum poly-
matrix games with no loops are volume conservative, and that they exhibit
Poincare´ recurrence behavior when there exists an interior Nash equilibrium. In
fact, this is also true for polymatrix games allowing self-loops. The proof is the
same in its structure, but the existence of self-loops requires to use different ar-
guments. The volume preservation is already given by Theorem 2 from previous
section. The idea is to prove that, under the assumption of the existence of an
interior Nash, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is a constant of motion, and that
this implies that every orbit is bounded in cumulative payoffs space. Then, the
Poincare´ recurrence theorem applies.
1 The theorem straightforwardly extends to any game that can be rewritten as the
sum of a N -player game in normal form and self-edges games (even without the
polymatrix condition).
Theorem 5. Consider a N -player zero-sum polymatrix game with self-loops.
Assume there exists an interior Nash equilibrium, then replicator dynamics is
Poincare´ recurrent.
The proof relies on two key lemmas proven in appendix (see B, C).
Lemma 1. Under the same assumptions and given x∗ an interior Nash equilib-
rium, the sum of Kullback-Leibler divergences
∑N
i=1 KL(x
∗
i ‖xi) is a constant of
motion.
Lemma 2. Under the same assumption and given x∗ an interior Nash equilib-
rium, the sum, for any interior point x ∈ int X , its orbit γ = {φ(x, t) : t ≥ 0}
is bounded away from the boundary.
Proof (Theorem 5). Then the theorem follows directly from Poincare´ recurrence
theorem. The volume is preserved in cumulative payoffs space, while every orbit
stays bounded. Hence, the system is Poincare´ recurrent in cumulative payoffs
space; and this property is transported to strategy space via the diffeomorphism
f−1. uunionsq
Remark 1. To show Theorem 5, we used the fact that KL(x∗‖−) is a constant
of motion. This property does not hold in general, but this is not the important
point; what is cirtical is that orbits remain bounded. The conservation of KL is
no more than a tool to show this very property.
5.2 Poincare´ recurrence and evolutionary game theory
Given any polymatrix game, either there exists an interior Nash equilibrium,
or no interior point is an equilibrium. The first case has been dealt with. As
far as the second case is concerned, previous work [26] have shown that in the
2-players case, the absence of interior Nash equilibria enforces orbits to collapse
to boundary. We show that this is also true for 1-player zero-sum games (i.e.,
for evolutionary game theory). Although not using the language of information
theory, the results about the existence of strict Lyapunov functions and collapse
to the boundary were first developed in [3]. Here we provide arguments to reduce
this case to the more well studied two agent zero-sum games. In combination
with our Poincare´ recurrence results, this will result in a complete picture of all
possible limit behaviors of the system.
Lemma 3 ([3]). Let A be the matrix of a 1-player zero-sum game with no
interior Nash equilibrium. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of maximal support.
Then for any x ∈ X in the interior, ddtKL(x∗‖x) < 0.
Our argument will use the 2-players result by giving a 2-players equivalent
formulation of the 1-player game. Let Γ 1 be a 1-player zero-sum game with A the
corresponding antisymmetric matrix. We claim that Γ 2, the 2-player polymatrix
game with matricesA1,2 = A andA2,1 = −AT is equivalent to Γ 1 in the following
way. There is a canonic bijection between Nash equilibria of Γ 1 and symmetric
Nash equilibria of Γ 2, that is, x∗ is an equilibrium of Γ 1 if, and only if (x∗, x∗)
is an equilibrium of Γ 2.
P A B
A
−AT
A
Fig. 3: The equivalent 2-players formulation
Moreover, it is easy to show that the diagonal D = {(x, x): x ∈ Γ 1(X )} is
a stable space of Γ 2 under replicator dynamics, and that its canonic projection
gives back exactly Γ 1. Now, if there is no interior equilibrium for Γ 1, there
cannot be interior symmetric equilibria for Γ 2. The key point will be to show
that there cannot be interior equilibria at all for Γ 2.
Lemma 4. Assume Γ 1 has no interior Nash. Then, Γ 2 has no interior Nash.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume there exists an interior Nash equi-
librium in Γ 2, say (x∗, y∗). It is well known that for each agent the set of equi-
librium strategies coincides with their maxmin strategies which only depend on
the agent’s own payoff matrix. Since both agents share the same payoff matrix,
x∗, y∗ are maxmin strategies for both agents and hence (x∗, x∗) is also an (inte-
rior) Nash of Γ 2. But this symmetric state is immediately a Nash equilibrium
for Γ 1 as well and we have reached a contradiction. uunionsq
Proof (Proposition 3). If the 1-player game of antisymmetric A has no interior
Nash, then its 2-player equivalent game has no interior Nash either. To avoid
ambiguities, write φ1 the flow of (3) of the 1-player game and φ2 the flow of (3)
of the 2-player one. Writing x∗ a Nash equilibrium of maximal support of the 1-
player version, for any strategy x of full-support, previous results [26] guarantee
d
dt
[
KL(x∗‖φ2((x, x), 0)1) + KL(x∗‖φ2((x, x), 0)2)
]
< 0 (9)
under the replicator dynamics on the 2-player equivalent game. As on the diag-
onal, this dynamic is exactly the one the 1-player game, we conclude
d
dt
[
KL(x∗‖φ1(x, 0))
]
< 0 (10)
uunionsq
Theorem 6 ([3]). Let be a 1-player zero-sum game with matrix A and with no
interior Nash equilibrium, on which we write φ the flow of (3). Let x∗ be a Nash
equilibrium. Then for any interior point x ∈ X , the orbit γ = {φ(x, t) : t ≥ 0}
collapses to boundary. More precisely, for all y ∈ ω(x), supp y ⊆ supp x∗.
The proof follows from standard Lyapunov arguments. For completeness, we
provide the proof in Appendix D. This theorem shows that in the absence of
any interior equilibrium, every interior orbits collapses to the face spanned by
supp(x∗) with a x∗ of maximal support. It tells nothing about the behavior of
orbits when coming close to this face. Do we have convergence, or do we get
(Poincare´) recurrence/cycles on the boundary? In general, both are possible,
depending on the initial condition.
Fig. 4: Converging and non-converging orbits in the same game.
Consider Rock-Paper-Scissor to which we add a dummy action, say Fork,
which scores -10 against any other action (excepted Fork itself). That is, consider
the 1-player zero-sum game with matrix
A =

0 −1 1 10
1 0 −1 10
−1 1 0 10
−10 −10 −10 0

The Nash equilibrium is unique and ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0). If one starts at (
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ), one
converges to it. If one starts at ( 316 ,
5
16 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ), one collapses to a periodic orbit on
the boundary.
Combining the results we have so far, we can prove a fairly complete theorem
relating volume conservation, Poincare´ recurrence and evolutionary game theory.
Theorem 7. Let be a 1-player matrix game A under the flow of replicator
dynamics. The volume is preserved in cumulative payoffs space if, and only if
the game is equivalent to a zero-sum game; more precisely, if, and only if A
can be written as A = B + (1 · · · 1)T (A1,1 · · · An,n) with B an antisymmetric
matrix.
If that is the case, interior orbits exhibits Poincare´ recurrent behavior if,
and only if there exists an interior Nash equilibrium. If there is no interior
equilibrium, every interior orbit collapses to the face spanned by the support of
a Nash equilibrium of maximal support.
Proof. Let A be a single-agent matrix game under replicator dynamics. Assume
the volume is conserved in cumulative payoff space. Then, by Theorem 3, A is
equivalent to a zero-sum game (A = B + (1 · · · 1)T (A1,1 · · · An,n) where B is
an antisymmetric matrix.). Conversely, if A is equivalent in the above sense to
a zero-sum game, one can assume without loss of generality that A is antisym-
metric. Then, by Theorem 2, the volume is preserved at any point. This proves
the first part of the theorem.
Now, assume A is antisymmetric. If there exists an interior Nash, by The-
orem 5, the system is Poincare´ recurrent. Conversely, if the system is Poincare´
recurrent, there has to exist an interior Nash. Assume on the contrary that there
is no such equilibrium. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Consider the open ball
U = B( 1n (1 . . . 1), ) with  > 0 small. We know that there exists an orbit γ
intersecting U infinitely often. If  is small enough, by taking x any point of γ,
that means that
lim sup[dist(φ(x, t),bd(X ))] > 0 (11)
But by Theorem 6, γ should collapses to the boundary. This contradicts (11). uunionsq
6 Cycles in dimension 3
In this section, we give a proof that the flow φ of replicator dynamics is periodic
for every interior initial condition of 1-player zero-sum games of dimension 3 with
interior Nash equilibrium. The proof uses the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem, that
we recall here.
Theorem 8 (Poincare´-Bendixson). A limit set ω(x) of a C1 dynamical sys-
tem over the plane, if non-empty and compact, that does not contain a rest point
is a periodic orbit.
In the following, we make the assumption that the game is a 1-player zero-
sum game of dimension 3 that has an interior Nash equilibrium x∗.
Lemma 5. Let be a 1-player zero-sum game with matrix A with an interior
Nash equilibrium. Then, for any interior initial condition x, the Kullback-Leibler
divergence to any interior Nash equilibrium x∗ is constant over the limit set ω(x).
More precisely, for any y ∈ ω(x), we have KL(x∗‖y) = KL(x∗‖x).
Proof. KL is continuous defined on the compact set X = ∆IRn, so is uniformly
continuous. What is more, by compactness of X , limt→∞ dist(x(t), ω(x)) = 0.
Therefore, since KL(x∗‖−) is a constant of motion by Lemma 1, we prove that
for any y ∈ ω(x), KL(x∗‖y) = lim KL(x∗‖x(tn)) = KL(x∗‖x). uunionsq
Lemma 6. Let be a 1-player zero-sum game of dimension 3 with matrix A.
Assume there exists an interior Nash. Then, for any interior point x, ω(x) is a
periodic orbit.
Proof. This system has clearly two degrees of freedom and is hence planar. Let
x? be any interior Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 5, KL(x?‖−) is a constant
of motion. If the initial point is not an equilibrium, the orbit is non-trivial and
KL(x?‖φ(x,−)) is constant and positive. Therefore, φ(x,−) is bounded away
from any rest point of the flow. It follows that ω(x) does not contain any rest
point and the statement follows by applying the Poincare´-Bendixson’s theorem.
uunionsq
Fig. 5: Up to now, we know that interior orbits should act like periodic orbits in
the limit. In general, it means that they show a spiral-like behavior, converging
to a Jordan’s curve. The point is to show these spirals are precisely periodic
orbits, i.e., that all these spirals are ellipsoid-like.
Theorem 9. Let be a 1-player zero-sum game of dimension 3 with matrix A.
Assume there exists an interior Nash. Then, any interior point x belongs to a
periodic orbit.
Proof. The result is obvious for interior equilibria. Assume x is not an equilib-
rium. By Lemma 6, ω(x) is a periodic orbit. It means that geometrically, ω(x)
is a Jordan’s curve of the plane ∆ : x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, so ∆ is separated into two
connected components; an interior A and an exterior B.
By assumption, we know that there is a rest point in the interior of X . What
is more, we also know that the time average of the strategy over ω(x) is an
equilibrium2, that will lie in the convex hull, hence interior to X . Let us denote
it x?. We claim that this x? has to be a point of A. Assume, on the contrary,
that x? /∈ A. Because ω(x) is non-trivial, A is non-empty. Let a ∈ A. Draw a
semi-infinite ray starting from x? ∈ B in the direction of a ∈ A. Because A is
bounded, this ray will transit from B to A then A to B at least once. Hence,
it cross ω(x) at least two times, say first ω1 then ω2. But, KL(x
?‖·) is a strict
convex function, globally minimal at x?, so will stricly increase as one advance
2 This follows immediately from the no-regret property of replicator [26].
on the ray. Therefore, KL(x?‖ω1) < KL(x?‖ω2), which contradicts Lemma 5.
Accordingly, x? ∈ A.
x?
ω1
ω2
A
B
B
x?
L
xω
Fig. 6: Geometric visualisation of the proof
To summarize, ω(x) is a periodic orbit, and its time average, an interior Nash
equilibrium x?, lies in the interior of ω(x), A. We want to prove that the orbit
starting from x is a periodic orbit. To prove that, we show that x ∈ ω(x). From
x?, fire a semi-infinite line L from x? in the direction of x. Because A is bounded,
this semi-infinite line have to cross ω(x) in at least a point. Choose one of those
and call it xω. We claim that KL(x
?‖−) is equal to KL(x?‖x) on L only at xω.
Indeed, KL(x?‖−) is a strict convex function with minimum at x?, so it is stricly
growing as one advances along the straight line L. As a consequence, xω is the
unique intersection point between L and KL−1(x?‖−)[KL(x?‖x)]. Accordingly,
x = xω ∈ ω(x). uunionsq
Proposition 1. Let be a one-player zero-sum game with n = 3 actions. The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) there exists an interior Nash equilibrium
(ii) there exists an interior cycle orbit
(iii) any orbit containing an interior point is an interior cycle.
Remark 2. This proof relies on the Kullback-Leibler divergence. That is, in a
Poincare´ recurrent system, we used an argument specific to game theory to show
that all interior orbits are periodic. Thinking of what Poincare´ recurrent means,
one may hope to get rid of the game theoretic proof and give a topological proof.
The motivation is clear; for any open set, almost every orbit goes back arbitrarily
close to its initial condition, and in addition, infinitely often. Therefore, we get
what looks like a dense set of periodic orbits.
That is, if a point is not a rest point, because we are in dimension two, its
orbit is infinitely-closely trapped between periodic orbits. There, we claim that
there is no hope to conclude that this orbit must be periodic with topological
arguments only. Look at the counter-example below.
Fig. 7: On the complex plane, consider the ODE z˙ = i z. The corresponding flow
is φ(z, t) = z · eit. Hence, every orbits are circles, excepted the single rest point
at the origin. Add the velocity regularizer δ : z 7→ min{1,dist(z, iIN)}. The ODE
becomes z˙ = i δ(z)z. Then, almost all orbits are still circles, so there is a dense
set of periodic orbits and the system is Poincare´ recurrent. Yet, if a point z has
integer module, it is arbitrarly close to a periodic orbit, and its limit set is the
rest point i|z|.
Acknowledgments
Georgios Piliouras acknowledges MOE AcRF Tier 2 Grant 2016-T2-1-170, grant
PIE-SGP-AI-2018-01 and NRF 2018 Fellowship NRF-NRFF2018-07. This work
was partially done while Victor Boone was a visitor at SUTD under the super-
vision of Georgios Piliouras. Victor Boone thanks Bruno Gaujal and Panayotis
Mertikopoulos for helping to arrange the visit and for their overall guidance and
mentorship.
References
1. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences
40(12), 145 – 156 (1978)
2. Replicator dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology 100(3), 533 – 538 (1983)
3. Akin, E., Losert, V.: Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games. J. of Math. Biology
20, 231–258 (1984)
4. Alon, N.: Combinatorial nullstellensatz. Combinatorics, Probability and Comput-
ing 8(1-2), 7–29 (1999)
5. Arora, S., Hazan, E., Kale, S.: The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-
algorithm and applications. Theory of Computing 8(1), 121–164 (2012)
6. Bailey, J.P., Gidel, G., Piliouras, G.: Finite Regret and Cycles with Fixed Step-
Size via Alternating Gradient Descent-Ascent. arXiv e-prints arXiv:1907.04392 (Jul
2019)
7. Bailey, J.P., Piliouras, G.: Multiplicative weights update in zero-sum games. In:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2018)
8. Bailey, J.P., Piliouras, G.: Fast and Furious Learning in Zero-Sum Games: Van-
ishing Regret with Non-Vanishing Step Sizes. In: NeurIPS (2019)
9. Bailey, J.P., Piliouras, G.: Multi-Agent Learning in Network Zero-Sum Games is
a Hamiltonian System. In: AAMAS (2019)
10. Barreira, L.: Poincare recurrence: old and new. In: XIVth International Congress
on Mathematical Physics. World Scientific. pp. 415–422 (2006)
11. Bomze, I.M.: Lotka-volterra equation and replicator dynamics: new issues in clas-
sification. Biological cybernetics 72(5), 447–453 (1995)
12. Boone, V., Piliouras, G.: From Darwin to Poincare´ and von Neumann: Recurrence
and cycles in evolutionary and algorithmic game theory. Arxiv (2019)
13. Cheung, Y.K., Piliouras, G.: Vortices instead of equilibria in minmax optimization:
Chaos and butterfly effects of online learning in zero-sum games. In: COLT (2019)
14. Conley, C.C.: Isolated invariant sets and the Morse index. No. 38, American Math-
ematical Soc. (1978)
15. Gaunersdorfer, A., Hofbauer, J.: Fictitious play, shapley polygons, and the repli-
cator equation. Games and Economic Behavior 11(2), 279–303 (1995)
16. Harper, M.: Escort evolutionary game theory. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
240(18), 1411–1415 (2011)
17. Hofbauer, J.: Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: A hamiltonian system?
J. of Math. Biology 34, 675–688 (1996)
18. Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge (1998)
19. Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1998)
20. Jaynes, E.T.: Information theory and statistical mechanics. Physical review 106(4),
620 (1957)
21. Karev, G.P.: Replicator equations and the principle of minimal production of in-
formation. Bulletin of mathematical biology 72(5), 1124–1142 (2010)
22. Kleinberg, R., Ligett, K., Piliouras, G., Tardos, E´.: Beyond the Nash equilibrium
barrier. In: Symposium on Innovations in Computer Science (ICS) (2011)
23. Kleinberg, R., Piliouras, G., Tardos, E´.: Multiplicative updates outperform generic
no-regret learning in congestion games. In: ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting (STOC) (2009)
24. Kwon, J., Mertikopoulos, P.: A continuous-time approach to online optimization.
Journal of Dynamics and Games 4, 125 (2017)
25. Mai, T., Panageas, I., Ratcliff, W., Vazirani, V.V., Yunker, P.: Cycles in Zero Sum
Differential Games and Biological Diversity. In: ACM EC (2018)
26. Mertikopoulos, P., Papadimitriou, C., Piliouras, G.: Cycles in adversarial regular-
ized learning. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Sympo-
sium on Discrete Algorithms. pp. 2703–2717. SIAM (2018)
27. Nagarajan, S.G., Mohamed, S., Piliouras, G.: Three body problems in evolutionary
game dynamics: Convergence, periodicity and limit cycles. In: Proceedings of the
17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
pp. 685–693. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent
Systems (2018)
28. von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton University Press (1944)
29. Omidshafiei, S., Papadimitriou, C., Piliouras, G., Tuyls, K., Rowland, M., Lespiau,
J.B., Czarnecki, W.M., Lanctot, M., Perolat, J., Munos, R.: {\alpha}-rank: Multi-
agent evaluation by evolution. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.01373 (2019)
30. Ostrovski, G., van Strien, S.: Piecewise linear hamiltonian flows associated to zero-
sum games: transition combinatorics and questions on ergodicity. Regular and
Chaotic Dynamics 16(1-2), 128–153 (2011)
31. Page, K.M., Nowak, M.A.: Unifying evolutionary dynamics. Journal of theoretical
biology 219(1), 93–98 (2002)
32. Panageas, I., Piliouras, G.: Average case performance of replicator dynamics in
potential games via computing regions of attraction. In: Proceedings of the 2016
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. pp. 703–720. ACM (2016)
33. Papadimitriou, C., Piliouras, G.: From Nash equilibria to chain recurrent sets: An
algorithmic solution concept for game theory. Entropy 20(10) (2018)
34. Papadimitriou, C., Piliouras, G.: Game dynamics as the meaning of a game. ACM
SIGecom Exchanges 16(2), 53–63 (2019)
35. Piliouras, G., Nieto-Granda, C., Christensen, H.I., Shamma, J.S.: Persistent pat-
terns: Multi-agent learning beyond equilibrium and utility. In: AAMAS. pp. 181–
188 (2014)
36. Piliouras, G., Schulman, L.J.: Learning dynamics and the co-evolution of compet-
ing sexual species. In: ITCS (2018)
37. Piliouras, G., Shamma, J.S.: Optimization despite chaos: Convex relaxations to
complex limit sets via poincare´ recurrence. In: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth
annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms. pp. 861–873. SIAM (2014)
38. Poincare´, H.: Sur le proble`me des trois corps et les e´quations de la dynamique.
Acta Math 13, 1–270 (1890)
39. Sandholm, W.H.: Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. MIT Press
(2010)
40. Sandholm, W.H., Dokumacı, E., Lahkar, R.: The projection dynamic and the repli-
cator dynamic. Games and Economic Behavior 64(2), 666–683 (2008)
41. Sato, Y., Akiyama, E., Farmer, J.D.: Chaos in learning a simple two-person game.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99(7), 4748–4751 (2002)
42. Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1995)
43. Zeeman, E.C.: Population dynamics from game theory. In: Global theory of dy-
namical systems, pp. 471–497. Springer (1980)
A Proof of Theorem 2
The proof makes use of the explicit formula of the diffeomorphism f−1 from
cumulative payoffs space to strategy space. For each player i and vector yi =
(yi,1 . . . yi,ni−1) of cumulative payoffs, we recall from [37,18] that the correspond-
ing strategy xi = f
−1(yi) is explicitly
(xi,1 . . . xi,ni) = (f
−1
1 (yi) . . .f
−1
ni (yi)) =
(
1
S(yi)
,
eyi,1
S(yi)
, . . . ,
eyi,ni−1
S(yi)
)
(12)
where S(yi) = 1 +
∑ni−1
α=1 e
yi,α .
Lemma 7. Let φ be the flow of replicator dynamics (3) with N agents. Let
ψ(y,−) = f(φ(f−1(y),−)) be the diffeomorphic flow onto cumulative payoffs
space. Then, its divergence is
div
∂ψ
∂t
(y) =
N∑
i=1
ni∑
α=1
ni∑
β=1
xi,αxi,β
(
∂ui,α
∂xi,α
− ∂ui,α
∂xi,β
)
(13)
Proof. We want to compute the divergence of the vector field in cumulative
costs space, that is,
∑N
i=1
∑ni−1
α=1
∂
∂yi,α
[
ui,α+1(f
−1(y))− ui,1(f−1(y))
]
. Using
the chain rule, this precisely is
∂
∂yi,α
ui,β(f−1(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(t)
)
 = 〈∇x(t)ui,β , ∂
∂yi,α
f−1(y)
〉
(14)
Recall that the divergence is given by the sum over i and α of terms expressed in
equation (14). If there is no loop, we do not need to compute this scalar product
since it is over vectors of disjoint supports; but this is not true in general. So,
we start by computing the right term of (14). In the three following equations,
we write S for 1 +
∑ni−1
γ=1 e
yi,γ . We check that
∂
∂yi,α
[
f−11 (y)
]
=
∂
∂yi,α
(
1
1 +
∑
γ e
yi,γ
)
= −e
yi,α
S2
= −xi,α+1xi,1 (15)
for γ 6= α, ∂
∂yi,α
[
f−1γ+1(y)
]
=
∂
∂yi,α
(
eyi,γ
1 +
∑
γ e
yi,γ
)
= −e
yi,αeyi,γ
S2
= −xi,α+1xi,γ+1
(16)
for γ = α,
∂
∂yi,α
[
f−1γ+1(y)
]
=
eyi,α
S
−
(
eyi,α
S
)2
= xi,α+1(1− xi,α+1) (17)
Injecting (15) (16) and (17) into (14), we get to
∂
∂yi,α
[
ui,β
(
f−1(y)
) ]
=
ni∑
γ=1
∂ui,β
∂xi,γ
∂f−1γ
∂yi,α
(y)
=
∂ui,β
∂xi,α+1
[
xi,α+1(1− xi,α+1)
]
−
∑
γ 6=α+1
[
xi,α+1xi,γ
∂ui,β
∂xi,γ
]
Recall that xi ∈ Xi, thus 1 − xi,α+1 =
∑
γ 6=α+1 xi,α. Using it in the above
equality, we obtain
∂
∂yi,α
[
ui,β(f
−1(y))
]
=
∑
γ 6=α+1
xi,α+1xi,γ
(
∂ui,β
∂xi,α+1
− ∂ui,β
∂xi,γ
)
(18)
Observe that the term for γ = α+ 1 would be null. Thus, we can add it. Then,
doing (18)[β := α+ 1]− (18)[β := 1], we get
∂y˙i,α
∂yi,α
=
ni∑
β=1
xi,α+1xi,β
[
∂ui,α+1
∂xi,α+1
− ∂ui,1
∂xi,α+1
+
∂ui,1
∂xi,β
− ∂ui,α+1
∂xi,β
]
(19)
Sum over i ∈ {1 . . . N} and α ∈ {1 . . . ni − 1}. As the term for α = 0 is null, we
can do the change of variable α′ := α + 1 and sum it from 1 to ni. Therefore,
the divergence is
div
∂ψ
∂t
(y) =
N∑
i=1
ni∑
α=1
ni∑
β=1
xi,αxi,β
[
∂ui,α
∂xi,α
− ∂ui,α
∂xi,β
+
∂ui,1
∂xi,β
− ∂ui,1
∂xi,α
]
(20)
But
∑ni
α=1
∑ni
β=1 xi,αxi,kβ
[
∂ui,1
∂xi,β
− ∂ui,1∂xi,α
]
is antisymmetric, so cancels out. We
are left with
div
∂ψ
∂t
(y) =
N∑
i=1
ni∑
α=1
ni∑
β=1
xi,αxi,β
[
∂ui,α
∂xi,α
− ∂ui,α
∂xi,β
]
(21)
uunionsq
Now, the proof of Theorem 2 is straightforward.
Proof (Theorem 2). We assume that all Ai,i are antisymmetric matrices. The
partial derivative is
∂ui,α
∂xi,γ
= (∂A
i,ixi
∂xi,γ
)α =
∂
∂xi,γ
[∑
β A
i,i
α,βxβ
]
= (Ai,iα,γ)α. Rewrite
(21).
div
∂ψ
∂t
(y) =
N∑
i=1
ni∑
α=1
ni∑
β=1
[
xi,αxi,β(A
i,i
α,α −Ai,iα,β)
]
(22)
But Ai,iα,α = 0 for all α, and for all i, (xi,αxi,βA
i,i
α,β)α,β is an antisymmetric
matrix, and hence the sum of all its coefficient is null. Accordingly, the right term
of (22) is zero, and applying Liouville’s formula (4), ψ conserves volume. uunionsq
Remark 3. Note that nowhere in the proof did we actually use the assumption
that the N -player game without the self-edges has to be a graphical polymatrix
game. The exact same proof would hold for any N -player normal form game
with antisymmetric self-edges.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Computing the time derivative, we get that
d
dt
[
N∑
i=1
KL(x∗i ‖xi)
]
=
N∑
i=1
ui(x)−
N∑
i=1
ni∑
αi=1
x∗i,αiui,αi(x) (23)
Now, recall that for zero-sum games,
∑
ui(−) = 0, since for any x,
N∑
i=1
ui(x) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ni∑
αi=1
nj∑
αj=1
xi,αixj,αjA
i,j
αi,αj (24)
that is a sum of all the coefficients of the antisymmetric matrix (Ai,jαi,αjxi,αixj,αj )
3 hence is zero. Therefore, (23) simplifies into
d
dt
[
N∑
i=1
KL(x∗i ‖xi)
]
= −
N∑
i=1
ni∑
αi=1
x∗i,αiui,αi(x) (25)
= −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ni∑
αi=1
nj∑
αj=1
x∗i,αiA
i,j
αi,αjxj,αj (26)
=
N∑
j=1
nj∑
αj=1
xj,αj
N∑
i=1
ni∑
αi=1
Aj,iαj ,αix
∗
i,αi (27)
Then,
d
dt
[
N∑
i=1
KL(x∗i ‖xi)
]
=
N∑
i=1
ni∑
αi=1
xi,αiui(x
∗) (28)
=
N∑
i=1
ui,αi(x
∗) = 0 (29)
where we used one fundamental property of full-support Nash equilibria, that is
here ui,αi(x
∗) = ui(x∗), to go from (28) to (29).
C Proof of Lemma 2
Let x be an interior point that is not an equilibrium. Then, according to the
previous lemma, for any y ∈ γ, C = ∑i KL(x∗i ‖xi) = ∑i(x∗i ‖yi) > 0. But
KL(x∗i ‖−) ≥ 0 for any player i, so KL(x∗i ‖y) is a point of the segment [0, C]
independently of the player i and the point y ∈ γ. Expanding KL(x∗i ‖y), this
means
x∗i,α log yi,α ≥ −C − h2(x∗i )−
∑
β 6=α
x∗i,β log yi,β (30)
3 Ai,jαi,αj = −Aj,iαj ,αi
for any player i and action α ∈ Ai, and where h2(x∗i ) is the Shannon entropy
of x∗i . Writing C
′
i,α =
∑
β 6=α x
∗
i,β log yi,β , we check that C
′
i,α is non-positive.
Therefore x∗i,α log yi,α ≥ −C − h2(x∗i ), that is
yi,α ≥ exp
(
−C + h2(x
∗
i )
x∗i,α
)
(31)
Define δ = mini∈N ,α∈Ai exp
(
−C+h2(x∗i )x∗i,α
)
. Then, at any point y ∈ γ, for any
player i and action α ∈ Ai, yi,α ≥ δ > 0. Accordingly, γ is bounded away from
the boundary.
D Proof of Theorem 6
This is a typical Lyapunov function argument. Let X ′ denotes the set of strategies
y of support strictly containing supp x∗. In particular, this set contains the
interior of X . Fix x ∈ X ′. By Proposition 3, ddtKL(x∗‖φ(x, 0)) < 0. We claim
that ω(x) ∩ X ′ = O/.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume that ω(x) ∩ X ′ 6= O/. Accordingly,
there exists y ∈ ω(x) ∩ X ′, and more precisely, there exists tn ↑ +∞ such that
limφ(x, tn) = y. It is clear that the orbit γ of x is a subset of X ′. Therefore,
t 7→ KL(x∗‖φ(x, t)) is a decreasing function. It is thus immediate that for all n,
KL(x∗‖φ(x, tn)) ≥ KL(x∗‖y), and because (tn) is a growing sequence diverging
to infinity,
∀t ≥ 0 KL(x∗‖φ(x, t)) ≥ KL(x∗‖y) (32)
Now, recall that y ∈ X ′, so ddtKL(x∗‖φ(y, 0)) < 0. So, there exists t′ > 0
such that KL(x∗‖y) > KL(x∗‖φ(y, t′)). In addition, using the continuity of φ,
limφ(x, t′ + tn) = limφ(φ(x, tn), t′) = φ(limφ(x, tn), t′) = φ(y, t′). But KL is
continuous as well, so
lim KL(x∗‖φ(x, t′ + tn)) = KL(x∗‖φ(y, t′)) (33)
Yet, KL(x∗‖y) > KL(x∗‖φ(y, t′)) so for n large enough,
KL(x∗‖φ(y, t′)) ≤ KL(x∗‖φ(x, t′ + tn)) < KL(x∗‖y) (34)
This contradicts (32).
